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Hazard, Jr. Geoffrey
LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
Professor Rhode's new book' invites all people seriously interested
in law to think about the relationships between law and justice as they
may exist in the years ahead. It is notoriously difficult to make
accurate predictions of the future, especially as the rate of social
change brings our futures into being with ever-increasing rapidity. As
a practical matter, thinking about the future therefore is pretty well
limited to extrapolating from the immediate present. Even such a
modest basis of projection affords room enough to look foolish. But
where angels fear to tread...
My thesis here involves three propositions. I believe these are valid
in retrospective or historical analysis, i.e., how we have come to our
present state. They seem to me of even greater weight in
contemplating the future. Our country, and indeed the world at large,
will be more intensively governed by law and legal institutions in the
century ahead than has been the case in the centuries immediately
past.
My first proposition is that talk of "justice" is empty unless it not
only references general normative considerations, such as equality and
liberty, but also references or posits specific and definite legal rules
and legal institutions. Second, when the legal rules and institutions
through which justice is constituted are specified, that is, when
discussion shifts from generalities to particulars, political controversy
is almost always immediately encountered. And, third, following from
the second proposition, serious discussion of "justice" must address
politically controversial issues concerning specific policy proposals.
I. JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW
The concept of justice without law perhaps is not incoherent, but it
is unavoidably vacuous. Justice is an ideal form of interpersonal
relationships. The ideal is expressed in various formulas: Life,
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness; Liberty, Equality and
* Trustee Professor of Law. University of Pennsylvania; Director Emeritus, American
Law Institute; Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale University.
1. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
(2000).
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Fraternity; From Each According to His Ability, To Each According
to His Need; Due Process and Equal Protection of the Law, etc. As
we have been instructed by Aristotle, the concept of justice includes
distributive justice as well as commutative justice, a duality that
roughly corresponds to the modem ideas of substantive and
procedural justice! It has been said by the philosopher Immanuel
Kant that justice requires every action to be in accordance with a
universal principle.' It has been said by the pragmatist Jeremy
Bentham that justice consists of the greatest good for the greatest
number.4 According to John Rawls, justice can be realized only by
normative choices made behind the veil of ignorance.5 All these
formulations connote that all persons should be treated equally and
according to general principles.
Stated negatively, the concept of justice is the avoidance of
injustice. Formulated in this way the concept has strong psychological
force because everyone has suffered injustice and feels such suffering
deeply and lastingly. But a private and subjective sense of injustice,
although entirely real, is insufficient material with which to construct a
system of justice. To transform a personal recognition of injustice into
interpersonal or social justice requires, at the very least, some process
of interpretation and articulation. The process can begin with the
person aggrieved, for example, in a statement of grievance or, more
formally, in allegations in a legal complaint.6 But voicing blame is
only the beginning of the process of seeking justice, as distinct from
simply seeking revenge. In seeking justice there must be a next stage
in which the grievant presents the complaint to someone who can
exercise authority. In a constitutional regime, such a person is a judge
or other legally constituted official. And in a constitutional regime
the judge must respond according to legal procedures and in
accordance with legally prescribed substantive legal standards.
A quest for justice in a constitutional regime in the real world
therefore entails an encounter with a real legal system, staffed by real
judges who decide cases according to established procedure and in
light of prescribed substantive legal standards.
All this is elementary, which is to say fundamental. But for that
reason it bears repeating. "Justice" that is not embedded in a legal
system, administered by duly appointed magistrates according to rules
of procedure and in accordance with legally prescribed substantive
2. See Aristotle, The Ethics 139-70 (E.V. Riev ed., J.A.K. Thomson trans., 1955).
3. See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals 19
(Marvin Fox ed., Thomas K. Abbott trans., 1949) ("I am never to act otherwise than
so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.").
4. See Jeremy Bentham, The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined 113-18 (1945).
5. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 52-56 (1971).
6. See William L. F. Felsteiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 631, 633-37 (1980).
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norms, is at most an idealized aspiration and at worst merely a
shibboleth. In contemporary American academic discussion there is
much talk about "justice" that is not anchored in the mundane
apparatus of judges and court clerks, pleadings and procedural
motions, and the technicalities of legal interpretation. In my view
these discussions are vacuous.
The significant questions about "justice" are encountered in
concrete situations where real choices must be made. For example, is
the legal principle of equal protection compatible with a rule giving
preference to minorities in the award of public contracts; is an unborn
child a "person" in the context of a wrongful death action, having in
mind that the categorization may be invoked in the context of
abortion; were the electors in Florida properly constituted in the
presidential election of 2000? Similar concrete issues arise in more
mundane contexts, as illustrated in the work of the American Law
Institute ("ALI"). The ALI had to address, for example, the precise
formulation of the rule governing the scope of discretion of members
of the board of directors of a business corporation, and the extent to
which the directors could rely on advice from technical specialists such
as accountants and lawyers. Another intensely debated issue was the
definition of a defective product in the context of the law of products
liability. In another part of the legal forest are efforts to define more
precisely the scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the terms on which class actions can be maintained in
the federal courts.
All these deliberations are at some level interesting, both
technically and philosophically. The participants in these legal
deliberations have sometimes been judges, as in the cases before the
courts; sometimes legislators and lawyers, as with regard to proposals
being considered by legislative bodies; and sometimes legal
academics. The participants in these focused deliberations have
thought that their efforts were worthwhile and important. They were
aware that the result of their work would or might become law.
Whatever the outcome of specific proposals for change in the law,
the aggregate of the responses is "justice." Obviously, an enactment
or judicial pronouncement of positive law does not foreclose further
debate about the merits of the provision in question. Nor does it
preclude amendment or repeal, in the case of a statute, or
distinguishing or overruling a precedent, in the case of judicial
decision. Until subsequent deliberations and legal and political
processes yield such a change, however, the operative content of
"justice" is that expressed in positive law. It is in at least this sense
that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was correct in saying that
2002] 1741
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"prophecies of what the courts will do in fact. .. are what I mean by
the law."7
II. LAW AND POLITICAL CONTROVERSY
The legal rules through which justice is administered at any given
time are themselves the product of political controversy and
disputation among various constituents in a particular political regime.
At any given time, of course, most legal rules are not in dispute. Not
everything in the law is always "up for grabs." Accordingly, most
members of the political community, including lawyers, accept the
resolutions of earlier disputes concerning legal rules and carry on
daily routines within the framework of law as thus established. This is
true of rules of procedure, including constitutional law, and rules of
substantive law.
For example, no sober person would want to revive the rule in
Plessy v. Ferguson,' even though some commentators would be willing
to question the basis of Brown v. Board of Education.9 So also, it has
come to rest that the police must continue to give Miranda warnings,"0
even though the logic and legitimacy of the original decision in the
Miranda case remains questionable. But we should not forget that
constitutional formulations announced in the Brown and Miranda
decisions resolved intensely controversial political choices.
Legal rules emanating from the legislative process are no less
controversial and obviously are political. Reference need be made
only to the pending battle over "patients' rights" in the health care
system, or to the debates over capital punishment. But controversies
over older legislative proposals, some of which have been adopted and
others rejected, remain in public consciousness and often still simmer.
Some examples include the terms on which workers can decide
whether to unionize and the basis and extent of liability for
environmental injuries. It is only a matter of social convenience and
necessity that the issues involved in these controversies can be
considered "settled."
Alexis de Tocqueville famously observed that "[tjhere is almost no
political question in the United States that is not resolved sooner or
later into a judicial question."'" But, by the same token, there is
almost no judicial question that is not subsumed in some kind of
political controversy. Law is politics, of a particular form, to be sure,
7. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461
(1897).
8. 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26,31-34 (1959).
10. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
11. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 257 (Mansfield & Winthrop
eds., 2000).
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but politics nevertheless, and actually or potentially controversial as
such.
Thus it can be said that "justice" in real-world terms necessarily
includes rules and regulations as actually administered in courts of
law; that "law" is what courts "will do in fact," 12 as Holmes had it; and
that what the courts will do in fact always involves potential political
controversy and often excites actual controversy. Of course, political
controversy concerning the suitability of a specific rule of positive law
is conducted through the medium of more general normative concepts
(such as equality and liberty). Furthermore, the controversy proceeds
on the premise that the proper measure of these general normative
concepts have not been particularized in the rules and regulations as
they stand. Nevertheless, the object of criticism, debate and
controversy includes the positive law at any given moment.
Ill. INSTITUTIONS FOR RESOLVING POLITICAL/LEGAL
CONTROVERSIES
The argument thus far is that issues of "justice" are political
questions whose resolution is in legal terms. The fact that resolution
of the issues is in legal terms, however, does not signify that the
process for resolution of any particular controversy is "legal." In this
country, the terms "legal" and "legal process" signify resolution
through judicial decision obtained in the course of litigation. Most
important controversies about "justice," however, are resolved
through legislation of some kind, either in legislatures such as
Congress and the state-level counterparts or in rule-making
proceedings in administrative agencies. The technical terms of the
statutes and regulations are no less "legal" for having been formulated
through legislative technique.
In today's world, the legislatures such as Congress generally resolve
the important major political controversies through statutes, while
administrative agency rule-making typically addresses more specific
issues within a statutory framework. Administrative rule-making in
our system has some similarities to the judicial process, primarily
through requirements of "notice" and "opportunity to be heard."
Also, the decisional process in administrative rule-making usually is
couched in technically intricate terms-hence "legalistic" terms-
concerning the agenda to be addressed, "fact finding," etc. But not far
underneath, administrative rule-making is very political, often as
much so as the legislative process.
Resolution of political disputes in the legislative process depends on
appreciation of interests and interest groups, on bringing influence to
bear, on trade-offs, on counting votes, and so on. These legislative
decisional instrumentalities are alien to the judicial process, indeed
12. Holmes, supra note 7, at 461.
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antithetical to it. Their use is unfamiliar and indeed uncomfortable to
many legally trained minds.
It seems likely, perhaps certain, however, that the major political
issues of the twenty-first century will be resolved through legislative
processes, including administrative rule-making, and not through
judicial decision. In this connection I refer to issues such as the death
penalty, abortion, school vouchers, financial support for public
education in the inner city, and so on. Those issues can be framed as
problems of "justice" and many of them in the past have been framed
as legal issues. But they are "political" in the sense of being
controversial in terms of normative values, as well as "legal" in terms
of formal expression in statute or regulation. Put differently, address
of issues of "justice" cannot escape the technical problems involved in
positive law.
CONCLUSION
The critical problem of "justice" in the future is not whether issues
of normative value can be framed as legal issues for resolution by the
judicial process through initiative of lawyers. They certainly can be.
But it is foreseeable that the courts will feel increasingly reluctant to
accept responsibility for resolving major issues in those terms. The
conservatism now evident in the Supreme Court of the United States
may well be a powerful trend quietly affecting the courts at all levels.
The trend, if it is such, can be said to reflect a sense that the judicial
forum is simply not the appropriate place to resolve disputes that are
obviously and deeply political. If so, we may have to adopt different
concepts, language and professional techniques in considering issues
of "justice."
[Vol. 701744
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